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Technology has outgrown the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  This creates two distinct but related challenges.  First, 
the scope of the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, which was originally 
formulated to address act-of-production issues for paper documents,1 
is ripe for review and clarification now that documents are almost al-
ways digital and often encrypted.  Second, the question of what con-
stitutes a “testimonial act” must be revisited to proactively ensure that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not evis-
cerated by emerging technologies. 
The Supreme Court articulated the foregone conclusion doctrine 
in 1976 in Fisher v. United States2 and revisited it a quarter of a century 
later in United States v. Hubbell.3  In neither case was the Court asked 
to consider the dizzying array of complex mechanisms available today 
to store and access electronic information. 
In the last three years, circuit and district courts drawing their au-
thority from Fisher and Hubbell have produced inconsistent rulings re-
garding the extent of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination with respect to encrypted digital documents.4  The 
question of whether a finger-swipe gesture used to unlock a 
smartphone is a testimonial act has also become important.  A circuit 
split on these critically important components of criminal procedure 
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 1 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000) (explaining that “the act of pro-
ducing documents in response to a subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect”). 
 2 425 U.S. 391, 411 (determining that the “existence and location” of the documents in 
question were a “foregone conclusion” and thus did not implicate any Fifth Amendment 
privileges). 
 3 530 U.S. at 44 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411) (considering the application of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine). 
 4 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012); United States 
v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
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is likely to occur in the near future.  When presented the opportuni-
ty, the Supreme Court should clarify the contours of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine and the scope of testimonial acts in the digital 
era. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment guarantee that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”5 as 
with almost all constitutional text, has a long and distinguished line 
of jurisprudence that has shaped the contours of the privilege.  The 
foregone conclusion doctrine, originally articulated by the Supreme 
Court in 1976, identified conditions under which compelled produc-
tion of documents does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.6  The 
doctrine turns directly on the distinction between testimonial and 
non-testimonial evidence7—a distinction that has become much more 
challenging in a world in which people interact with electronic in-
formation in increasingly varied ways.  In addition, technological ad-
vancements that offer the prospect of being able to infer—and in 
some cases even directly observe—thought processes raise difficult 
questions of the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection. 
In short, in an era when documents are almost always electronic, 
often encrypted, and increasingly stored in the “cloud,” the current 
framework with respect to compelled production is inadequate to 
address the complex range of scenarios that are starting to arise.  To-
day’s courts thus face the unenviable challenge of engaging in con-
tortions to fit the square peg of contemporary encryption and docu-
ment storage methods into the round hole of existing Fifth 
Amendment doctrine.  This is yet another manifestation of the ability 
of technological advancements to reshape the fundamental contours 
of constitutional protections. 
We describe some key challenges that technological advances pose 
to the Fifth Amendment with respect to the act of production doc-
trine, and propose a set of prescriptive solutions that are better 
matched to today’s technologies.  In particular, we argue that courts 
have misapplied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hubbell by reading in 
a requirement of “location” rather than “possession.” 
It is important to note that we focus our analysis on circumstances 
where the government has an established right, through a validly ex-
ecuted search warrant, or other exception, such as a routine border 
 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 6 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
 7 Id. at 408–11. 
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search,8 to conduct a search or seizure.  We do not address Fourth 
Amendment considerations, which raise their own separate and im-
portant issues in light of technological advances. 
II.  THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE AND TESTIMONIAL ACTS 
The Supreme Court has prefaced its inquiries into the Fifth 
Amendment by explaining that the oft-repeated term “privilege 
against self-incrimination” is “not an entirely accurate description of a 
person’s constitutional protection against being ‘compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”9  The limits of the priv-
ilege extend only to the compulsion of “incriminating communica-
tions . . . that are ‘testimonial’ in character.”10  As the Court wrote in 
1911, compelling a defendant to “yield possession of property that he 
no longer is entitled to keep” is a question “not of testimony but of 
surrender.”11 
Perhaps the test that most defines modern conceptions of the 
privilege comes from the 1957 case Curcio v. United States.12  In 1956, 
Joseph Curcio, who was then the secretary-treasurer of Local 269 of 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in New York, was sub-
poenaed to produce the union’s records.13  During testimony before a 
grand jury, he stated that the records were not in his possession and 
then invoked his right against self-incrimination in refusing to state 
who held them or where they were stored.14  Upon his refusal, the 
District Court found him guilty of criminal contempt and ordered 
him incarcerated.15  The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, but 
the Supreme Court overturned, holding that forcing a custodian to 
“testify orally as to the whereabouts of nonproduced records requires 
him to disclose the contents of his own mind.  He might be compelled to 
convict himself out of his own mouth.  That is contrary to the spirit 
and letter of the Fifth Amendment.”16 
The “contents of . . . mind” language from Curcio17 provided the 
basis for Justice Stevens’ oft-cited 1988 dissent in Doe v. United States, 
 
 8 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (stating that conducting a 
routine border search does not require any basis for suspicion). 
 9 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). 
 10 Id. 
 11 In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279. 
 12 354 U.S. 118. 
 13 Id. at 119. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 121. 
 16 Id. at 128 (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. 
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where he wrote that a defendant may “be forced to surrender a key to 
a strongbox containing incriminating documents,” but could not “be 
compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe—by word or 
deed.”18  The majority incorporated this language in dicta.19 
A.  The Doctrine Articulated: Fisher 
In the 1976 case Fisher v. United States, attorneys refused to pro-
duce taxpayer documents sought by the IRS, citing their client’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege.20  The Supreme Court ruled for the IRS, and 
in its holding the Court articulated what has become known as the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, explaining that “the act of producing 
[the papers]—the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to do—
would not itself involve testimonial self-incrimination.”21  The Court 
held that the government can compel production when the “exist-
ence and location [of documents] are a foregone conclusion and 
[the defendant] adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Gov-
ernment’s information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”22 
B.  Hubbell: The Last Word from the Supreme Court 
In the 2000 case United States v. Hubbell, a grand jury subpoenaed 
documents from an official who refused to comply, asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.23  The district court ordered the documents to 
be produced, and granted “use and derivative-use” immunity under 
18 U.S.C. § 6002.24  In a subsequent action challenging the use of the-
se documents in a criminal case on Fifth Amendment grounds, the 
Supreme Court found Hubbell’s production of documents to be a 
testimonial act, relying in large part on the lack of a priori govern-
ment knowledge of the subpoenaed documents.25 
The Court wrote that “the act of producing documents in re-
sponse to a subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect,” as 
“[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive 
use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of 
documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena.”26  The Court 
 
 18 487 U.S. 201, 219. 
 19 See id. at 210 n.9. 
 20 425 U.S. 391, 393–95. 
 21 Id. at 411. 
 22 Id. (citing In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)). 
 23 530 U.S. 27, 31. 
 24 Id. at 38 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). 
 25 Id. 41–43. 
 26 Id. at 36, 43 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); Doe v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)). 
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also noted that the act of production and the custodian’s compelled 
testimony as to whether all documents demanded have been pro-
duced “certainly communicate information about the existence, cus-
tody, and authenticity of the documents.”27 
It has been observed that the Hubbell Court may have gone farther 
than merely contrasting the facts in Hubbell from those in Fisher, read-
ing the case as expressing doubt as to the prudential applicability of 
the foregone conclusion doctrine.28 The Hubbell Court lamented the 
lack of clarity in the foregone conclusion doctrine, and in dicta estab-
lished the vague standard that would be applied by lower courts in 
subsequent years: 
Whatever the scope of this “foregone conclusion” rationale, the facts of 
this case plainly fall outside of it.  While in Fisher the Government already 
knew that the documents were in the attorneys’ possession and could in-
dependently confirm their existence and authenticity through the ac-
countants who created them, here the Government has not shown that it 
had any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of 
the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent.29 
C.  Ponds and the Reasonable Particularity Standard 
Lower courts have applied a standard requiring a showing of “ex-
istence, custody, and authenticity,” drawing authority from the 
Court’s language in Hubbell.30  The Supreme Court heard Hubbell on 
certiorari from the D.C. Circuit, and affirmed the decision of the lower 
court.31  However, the Supreme Court did not adopt the exact word-
ing of the D.C. Circuit, which had suggested that for a response to a 
subpoena request to be non-testimonial in nature, the government 
must “‘establish[] its [pre-subpoena] knowledge of the existence, 
possession, and authenticity of the subpoenaed documents with ‘rea-
sonable particularity’’ such that ‘the communication inherent in the act 
of production can be considered a foregone conclusion.’”32  Instead, 
the Supreme Court left Hubbell with the broader “existence, control, 
and authenticity” standard, declining to adopt the proposed standard 
of “reasonable particularity.” 
 
 27 Id. at 37. 
 28 See Mark A. Cowen, Note, The Act-of-Production Privilege Post-Hubbell: United States v. 
Ponds and the Relevance of the “Reasonable Particularity” and “Foregone Conclusion” Doctrines, 
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 873 (2010). 
 29 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45. 
 30 See id. at 37, 41. 
 31 See id. at 46. 
 32 United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s actions in Hubbell, in the 2006 case 
United States v. Ponds, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless decided to readopt 
the “reasonable particularity” standard it had proposed in its own 
Hubbell decision.33  The D.C. Circuit justified its decision to do so by 
noting that its earlier decision in Hubbell had not been overturned, 
and further, that this standard had been adopted by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.34  It has since been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit as well.35 
D.  Defining the Boundaries of “Testimony” 
In considering the limits of behavior that constitutes testimonial 
communication, the Court held in 1966 that the Fifth Amendment 
“offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, 
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, 
to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a 
particular gesture.”36  The Court in Hubbell pointed to a long line of 
case law that establishes that a criminal suspect may be  
[C]ompelled to put on a shirt, to provide a blood sample or handwriting 
exemplar, or to make a recording of his voice.  The act of exhibiting such 
physical characteristics is not the same as a sworn communication by a 
witness that relates either express or implied assertions of fact or belief.37 
However, commentators have noted the long history of incon-
sistency and unpredictability in divining what qualifies as a testimoni-
al act.38  For example, Allen and Mace have noted that attempts to 
reconcile the use of machines to interpret non-vocal physiological re-
sponses to stimuli with existing “testimonial” doctrine “feeds the 
sense that there is a conceptual hole at the middle of the Fifth 
Amendment.”39 
III.  COMPELLED DECRYPTION: RECENT RULINGS 
Encryption poses clear challenges for applying the foregone con-
clusion doctrine.  Today’s encryption technologies are sufficiently ad-
vanced to effectively block any attempt at a brute force attack: While 
 
 33 Id. at 320–21. 
 34 Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 35 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 36 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 37 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 594–98 (1990)). 
 38 See Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future 
Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (2004). 
 39 Id. at 249. 
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in theory it is possible to attempt every possible password, the num-
ber of possible combinations means that such an attack would stand 
almost no chance of succeeding in any reasonable time frame.  This 
was explicitly noted by prosecutors in In re Boucher, who had seized a 
laptop computer but were unable to decrypt its contents: “The gov-
ernment is not able to open the encrypted files without knowing the 
password.  In order to gain access . . . the government is using an au-
tomated system which attempts to guess the password, a process that 
could take years.”40 
An additional complication is that encryption can be used to 
scramble the entire contents of a hard drive or other storage device, 
making it impossible to distinguish ones and zeros that might repre-
sent a document from ones and zeros that are nothing but empty 
storage space.41  This aspect of encryption is unique to digital storage 
media.  Encryption, of course, is not new, having played a role in his-
torical events such as the failed 1586 plot to assassinate Queen Eliza-
beth and place Mary Queen of Scots on the throne42 and the German 
Enigma machines used during World War II.43  But an encrypted pa-
per document is typically identifiable as exactly that, and there is no 
difficulty in distinguishing it from the empty space that may sit above 
it in a storage box.  By contrast, an encrypted digital document can 
be impossible to separate from its digital surroundings, regardless of 
whether those surroundings contain other documents or the digital 
equivalent of empty space.  This raises obvious challenges with re-
spect to establishing the existence and location of documents as re-
quired by the foregone conclusion doctrine. 
In various district courts around the country, we have seen judges 
struggle to apply the Court’s “existence, custody, and authenticity” 
and “foregone conclusion” standards in cases where the government 
requires a password to access encrypted files on a digital storage de-
vice that the government has in its possession. 
 
 40 No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *5–6 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 41 See, for example, TrueCrypt: “Until decrypted, a TrueCrypt partition/device appears to 
consist of nothing more than random data (it does not contain any kind of ‘signature’).  
Therefore, it should be impossible to prove that a partition or a device is a TrueCrypt 
volume or that it has been encrypted (provided that the security requirements and pre-
cautions listed in the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions are followed).”  Plausible 
Deniability, TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 42 See SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT TO 
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 1–3 (1999). 
 43 See id. at 181. 
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A.  Kirschner 
In United States v. Kirschner, the Eastern District of Michigan held 
in a 2010 ruling that a grand jury subpoena, issued without immunity, 
requiring the defendant to divulge the password to decrypt an en-
crypted hard drive, would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege.44  
Noting that “the government is not seeking documents or objects—it 
is seeking testimony from the Defendant, requiring him to divulge 
through his mental processes his password—that will be used to in-
criminate him,” the court quashed the subpoena, “thereby protecting 
[the Defendant’s] invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination.”45 
B.  Boucher 
In In re Boucher, a government agent examined, with the defend-
ant’s assistance, an encrypted drive on a laptop and ascertained that 
it contained incriminating files.46  The defendant later sought to in-
voke his Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing subsequent requests 
to divulge his password.47  The District of Vermont, in rejecting the 
assertion of the privilege, held in 2009 that “providing access to the 
unencrypted [] drive ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information’ about the existence and location of files 
that may contain incriminating information.”48  Additionally, the 
court noted that the “act of producing an unencrypted version of the 
[] drive likewise is not necessary to authenticate it.  He has already 
admitted to possession . . . and provided the Government with ac-
cess . . . .”49 
C.  Fricosu 
In United States v. Fricosu, the government recorded conversations 
between the defendant and a third party that suggested that encrypt-
ed files on a seized laptop contained incriminating files.50  The case 
was heard in the District of Colorado, which as part of the Tenth Cir-
cuit has not adopted the reasonable particularity standard.  In Janu-
ary 2012, the District of Colorado ordered the defendant to supply 
 
 44 823 F. Supp. 2d 665. 
 45 Id. at 669. 
 46 No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *4–5 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 47 Id. at *2. 
 48 Id. at *9 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). 
 49 Id. at *9–10. 
 50 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235 (D. Colo. 2012). 
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the password to decrypt the laptop under the foregone conclusion 
doctrine, arguing that “[t]he fact that [the government] does not 
know the specific content of any specific documents is not a barrier 
to production.”51  While the case might have received further atten-
tion at the circuit level, the issue of compelled decryption of the 
seized laptop was rendered moot when the government was able to 
decrypt the drive without the defendant’s assistance.52 
D.  The Eleventh Circuit 
One of the most expansive recent rulings to address compelled 
decryption was issued by the Eleventh Circuit in February 2012 in In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011.53  In October 
2010, law enforcement agents pursuing a child pornography investi-
gation tracked a Florida man suspected of sharing illegal images to a 
hotel room in California.54  After obtaining a search warrant, they 
raided the room, seizing computers and hard drives with nearly five 
terabytes of total storage capacity.55  However, they soon hit a road-
block: Portions of the hard drives had been encrypted and were un-
readable without a password.56  The suspect refused to decrypt the 
drives, and a federal district court in Florida held him in contempt 
and ordered him incarcerated.57 
In February 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals over-
turned the contempt holding, ruling that the suspect’s refusal was 
protected under the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.58  The court applied the Ponds “reasonable particulari-
ty” standard, noting that  
[I]f the Government is unaware of a particular file name, it still must 
show with some reasonable particularity that it seeks a certain file and is 
aware, based on other information, that (1) the file exists in some speci-
fied location, (2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and 
(3) the file is authentic.  Thus, although the Government need not know 
the name of a particular file or account, it still must be able to establish 
that a file or account, whatever its label, does in fact exist.59 
 
 51 Id. at 1237. 
 52 See David Kravets, Constitutional Showdown Voided: Feds Decrypt Laptop Without Defendant’s 
Help, WIRED (Feb. 29, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/
decryption-flap-mooted/. 
 53 670 F.3d 1335. 
 54 Id. at 1339. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1340. 
 58 Id. at 1341. 
 59 Id. at 1349 (citation omitted). 
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IV.  SHOULD “LOCATION” BE A PRONG OF THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION 
DOCTRINE? 
Digital encryption raises, in a new context, the same two founda-
tional issues—specificity of a priori government knowledge, and the 
bounds of testimony—that have underpinned much of the case law 
relating to the foregone conclusion doctrine: First, to what level of 
specificity must the government have knowledge regarding encrypted 
documents before it can compel decryption? And second, under what 
circumstances is the act of providing the government information 
that might help it decrypt documents testimonial? 
A.  Is “Reasonable Particularity” a Reasonable Standard? 
The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted the “reason-
able particularity” standard under the auspices of the “existence, cus-
tody, and authenticity” framework elaborated in Hubbell.  Application 
of this framework would seem to indicate that absent external, prior 
verification of incriminating documents, as was the case in Boucher, 
the technological capabilities in commercially available encryption 
software present a nearly insurmountable hurdle for the government 
to use the foregone conclusion doctrine to compel decryption of an 
encrypted storage device. 
However, it is not at all clear that the reasonable particularity 
standard will be adopted by the other circuits.  It is even less clear 
that the “reasonable particularity” standard is the correct rule—either 
in terms of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Hubbell or in terms 
of current technologies.  Given that the Supreme Court was specifi-
cally presented with the “reasonable particularity” standard in Hubbell 
and chose not to adopt it, there is a question as to whether its contin-
ued application at the circuit level is proper. 
B.  Clouding the Concept of “Location” 
More fundamentally, the right question to ask may not be whether 
the location must be known with “reasonable particularity,” but 
whether location is an appropriate test to apply at all.  The term “lo-
cation” suggests a specific, physically identifiable device or place that 
contains the documents in question.  This is ill-matched to an envi-
ronment for storing and exchanging documents that is increasingly 
based on cloud computing, which of course is designed in part to ab-
stract away the need to know or track location. 
Unsurprisingly, determining the location of a document stored in 
the cloud is difficult.  A user of Google Docs or Amazon’s cloud-based 
Simple Storage Service typically has no information regarding what 
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specific physical storage device is used to store his or her documents.  
In addition, in many cases the location of a document may be dynam-
ic.  A document can initially be stored in one place, and then repeat-
edly moved by a cloud service provider as part of a resource rebalanc-
ing process.  The cloud service provider might sometimes choose to 
store multiple copies of a document, or to partition a single copy of 
the document into separately stored fragments.  All of these actions 
would of course be invisible to the document owner. 
Investigators aiming to identify the location of a particular docu-
ment stored on the cloud would need to (1) determine the suspect’s 
cloud service provider, (2) identify the location of the (likely en-
crypted) data controlled by the suspect, and (3) identify which subset 
of that data was associated with the desired document.  Clearly, these 
steps would involve many hurdles. 
It is also possible to envision ways for a document owner to use 
cloud computing in a manner intentionally structured to challenge 
the very concept of location.  Consider, for example, software de-
signed to take a single document, partition it into thousands of frag-
ments, and store each of those fragments on a different peer-to-peer 
server somewhere on the Internet.  There would not even need to be 
a single master map identifying the location of each fragment; that 
map itself could be stored in a distributed manner, or woven into the 
document’s data fragments.  To further complicate matters, software 
could be designed to automatically move the document fragments 
every few hours, or even every few seconds.  The result would be a 
document stored on a literally global scale across a constantly shifting 
mosaic of servers. 
What is the location of such a document that is, in a sense, both 
nowhere and everywhere?  Clearly, it would be impossible for author-
ities to meet the Ponds standard of identifying the document’s loca-
tion to “reasonable particularity” when attempting to compel produc-
tion.  Even if authorities were somehow able to obtain a list of the 
relevant server locations at a particular snapshot in time, the list 
would be obsolete by the time they petitioned a court to compel pro-
duction.  Even in the absence of the “reasonable particularity” stand-
ard, the foregone conclusion doctrine’s requirement with respect to 
“location” is clearly ill-suited for these types of scenarios. 
It is tempting here to create a distinction between the Fifth 
Amendment as applied to the physical world from that as applied to 
the digital domain.  However, creating one set of constitutional 
standards for digital or digitally stored information and another set of 
standards for the “physical world” is problematic for a number of rea-
sons.  Not only would this raise consistency issues, but there is also a 
threshold question of whether digital and physical domains can be 
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realistically distinguished.  Digital information which exists at one or 
more locations unknown even to its owner does still physically reside 
on real storage devices—and as computers find their ways into here-
tofore unexpected aspects of our daily lives, proposing to distinguish 
physical and digital as separate domains for purposes of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine would be improper.  The better approach is to 
update the doctrine so that it can be applied more ably to both do-
mains. 
C.  Hubbell and Fisher Reconsidered 
In that context, a closer reading of Hubbell is instructive.  Hubbell 
did not codify an interpretation of the Constitution that would re-
quire the government to specify the “location,” or “whereabouts,” of 
information to fulfill the requirements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.  Instead, the Hubbell Court expressed doubt that the gov-
ernment could fulfill the requirements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine where it “has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of 
either the existence or the whereabouts”60 of the documents. 
The Court in Hubbell discussed the foregone conclusion doctrine 
in the negative and never expressly stated that both existence and lo-
cation must be specified for the government to prevail when seeking 
to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine.  Instead, the Hubbell Court 
repeatedly stated that the foregone conclusion doctrine is inapplicable 
when a defendant is compelled to provide information regarding the 
existence, possession (or control), or authenticity of documents.61 
It is quite possible for the government to show knowledge of ex-
istence, possession, and authenticity without specifying the techno-
logically problematic “location” of such information.  Thus, there is a 
path that is fully consistent with Hubbell to removing the explicit re-
quirement of location and, along with it, the question of whether lo-
cation must be known with reasonable particularity. 
It could be argued that Fisher gives more weight to location than 
Hubbell.  Consider Fisher’s oft-cited holding that “[t]he existence and 
location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer 
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s infor-
mation by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”62  However, the 
Fisher Court also stated that “[i]t is doubtful that implicitly admitting 
the existence and possession of the papers rises to the level of testi-
 
 60 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000). 
 61 See id. at 41, 43–45. 
 62 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
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mony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”63  In 1976, the 
concepts of “possession” and “location” of documents were far more 
closely intertwined than they are today, and the Fisher Court’s appar-
ent use of these terms in an interchangeable manner was under-
standable.  Fisher can also be interpreted as conveying that the core 
concept is “possession”—which mapped in 1976 directly to location, 
but no longer does.  To the extent that these readings as to whether 
location is an inescapable requirement of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine are potentially inconsistent, Hubbell must be given more 
weight as the more recent ruling. 
V.  FOREGONE CONCLUSION: AN UPDATED FRAMEWORK 
Recent circuit cases on compelled decryption usually characterize 
the three prongs of the foregone conclusion doctrine as existence, 
location, and authenticity.  However, we believe that replacing “loca-
tion” with “possession” or “control” is the correct reading of Hubbell.  
If the government is able to establish that a suspect possesses a par-
ticular file, the suspect should not then be able to effectively circum-
vent government efforts to obtain the document by simply using en-
cryption to bury it in a mass of indistinguishable ones and zeros on a 
hard drive.  Similarly, a document placed in the cloud, either in en-
crypted form or not, remains within the possession of the suspect. 
The “existence” prong remains an appropriate component of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.  However, establishing that it is met 
can be difficult with digital documents.  It will often be possible for 
the government to prove, through records subpoenaed from Internet 
or wireless service providers, that a suspect has downloaded a particu-
lar document.  However, while this shows that the document existed 
(and was possessed by the suspect) at some point in the past, it does 
not show that the document still exists. 
In many digital environments, “deleting” a document does not ac-
tually overwrite it on a storage device.  Instead, it typically frees the 
associated storage space so that it can be used to store new infor-
mation.  Whether and how quickly the original document data is ac-
tually overwritten with new data depends, of course, on many factors.  
From a purely technical standpoint, the document can reasonably be 
said to exist as long as it is recoverable. 
How can the government show that a document that was down-
loaded one month, or one year, ago still exists?  The government will 
almost never be able to prove the negative—i.e., that in the interven-
 
 63 Id. 
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ing time the suspect did not delete and overwrite the relevant file.  
Forcing the government to provide that proof would be tantamount 
to putting nearly all encrypted digital documents beyond discovery.  
On the other hand, exposing suspects to compelled decryption just 
because they are known, at some potentially distant time in the past, 
to have received a particular document, puts far too much power in 
the hands of the government. 
Between these two undesirable extremes there is a solution, 
though not a perfect one: The government must show that the doc-
uments in question did indeed recently64 exist on media controlled by 
the suspect.  Defendants ordered to decrypt the associated media get 
immunity for all documents that were not specifically identified in 
the government’s showing of “existence.”  This would prevent gov-
ernment fishing expeditions to acquire previously unknown docu-
ments for use against the suspect. 
VI.  DOES TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE THE BOUNDARIES OF WHAT IS 
TESTIMONIAL? 
The issue of compelled decryption inevitably turns in large part 
on the question of what constitutes a testimonial act.  While prece-
dent clearly establishes that mere physical characteristics are not af-
forded the protections of the Fifth Amendment, emerging technolo-
gies increasingly blur the distinction between physical attributes or 
actions and assertions of fact or belief. 
Courts generally agree that divulging a password constitutes a tes-
timonial act.  Conversely, it is clear that a thumbprint is clearly non-
testimonial, and the Fifth Amendment would not block authorities 
from compelling a suspect to provide a thumbprint needed to unlock 
his or her computer.  The image of a suspect’s face is also non-
testimonial.  Wireless device maker HTC was recently granted a pa-
tent for the use of face recognition in unlocking a computing device 
such as a smartphone.65  The owner of such a phone, if it were seized 
in a future criminal investigation, could not prevent authorities from 
using the image of his or her face to unlock it. 
 
 64 There is not necessarily an ideal answer to the question of what, exactly, “recent” might 
mean.  Leaving the time duration unspecified creates the potential for governmental 
abuse.  On the other hand, picking a particular number of days, weeks, or months would 
create what amounts to a very short statute of limitations, which would be problematic for 
other reasons, including the likely creation of software specifically designed to circum-
vent the time limit.  In our view, this should be subject to review by a trial court to evalu-
ate in the context of the alleged duration of the criminal activity. 
 65 See Vlad Bobleanta, HTC Wins Patent for Face Unlock, UNWIRED VIEW (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.unwiredview.com/2012/04/04/htc-wins-patent-for-face-unlock/. 
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A.  Are Gestures Testimonial? 
Gestures, however, present a more complex case.  For example, 
consider the “pattern lock” used in place of a traditional alphanumer-
ic password to secure some smartphones.  These phones are un-
locked when their owner traces a finger over the screen in a specific, 
personalized pattern.  The pattern is chosen by the owner when he or 
she first acquires and configures the smartphone and is not generally 
known to the manufacturer of the phone or to the associated wireless 
service provider. 
Pattern locks have already become an issue in criminal investiga-
tions.  In January 2012, FBI agents seized a phone secured by a pat-
tern lock from a suspect in a San Diego-area prostitution investiga-
tion.66  As detailed in an FBI affidavit, technicians “attempted to gain 
access to the contents of the memory of the cellular telephone in 
question, but were unable to do so.”67  The affidavit further explains: 
Failure to gain access to the cellular telephone’s memory was caused by 
an electronic “pattern lock” programmed into the cellular telephone.  A 
pattern lock is a modern type of password installed on electronic devices, 
typically cellular telephones.  To unlock the device, a user must move a 
finger or stylus over the keypad touch screen in a precise pattern so as to 
trigger the previously coded un-locking mechanism.  Entering repeated 
incorrect patterns will cause a lock-out, requiring a Google email login 
and password to override.  Without the Google email login and password, 
the cellular telephone’s memory can not be accessed.68 
Having failed to identify the pattern needed to unlock the phone, 
federal investigators sought, and were granted, a warrant ordering 
Google to provide the login and password that would, in effect, cir-
cumvent the pattern lock.69 
Despite that workaround, it appears that the disclosure of a pat-
tern is a testimonial act, as it “requires [the defendant] to disclose the 
contents of his own mind.”70  The government should have no more 
ability to compel the phone owner to disclose the pattern than it 
would have to compel disclosure of an alphanumeric password.71  
 
 66 See Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant Application at 4–5, No. 3:12-mj-00882-NLS 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/
2012/03/gov.uscourts.casd_.378626.1.0.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 67 Id. at 7. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, No. 3:12-mj-00882-NLS (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
9, 2012), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/03/
gov.uscourts.casd_.378626.1.0.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 70 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). 
 71 However, unlike a password, the pattern may be discernible without ever consulting the 
smartphone owner, especially if the phone has been unlocked hundreds of times.  Much 
as a dirt path is formed in a grassy field that is repeatedly traversed in the same way, using 
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While courts have addressed the testimonial nature of these technol-
ogies on an ad hoc basis, emerging technologies present broader con-
stitutional challenges that are not so easily reconciled. 
B.  Keeping Secrets from Big Brother: Technologies That Can Read Our 
Thoughts 
It is tempting to make the distinction that physically measurable 
biometric attributes (fingerprints, iris and retina attributes, the shape 
of someone’s face, etc.) are non-testimonial, while interactions with a 
device (entering a password, using a finger to trace the pattern in a 
pattern lock) involve testimonial information.  But this distinction 
faces challenges given the increasing ability to obtain measurements 
conveying the contents of a person’s mind.  In fact, the entire con-
cept of protecting the contents of a person’s mind rests on the as-
sumption that those contents must be voluntarily disclosed before 
others can know them.  Current technology trends call the strength 
of that assumption into question. 
For example, eye-tracking uses images from one or more cameras 
to capture subtle changes in the movements and structure of our 
eyes.  Researchers in the United States and the United Kingdom have 
mapped the correlation between blink rates,72 pupil dilation,73 and 
deception.  The Department of Homeland Security has been using 
eye-tracking technology in a “pre-crime” program aimed at identify-
ing criminals before they act.74  The DHS program, known as Future 
Attribute Screening Technology, is designed to analyze images ac-
quired at airport security checkpoints to measure eye movement, po-
sition, and gaze (as well as heart rate, respiration, and facial expres-
sion) to identify behavior deemed suspicious.75 
Eye-tracking and related methods could allow investigators to ask 
questions that lead to information about the contents of a suspect’s 
 
a pattern on a smartphone could create subtle evidence of wear on the screen that could 
be identified using advanced imaging and measurement techniques.  These measure-
ments, of course, would not implicate the Fifth Amendment.  Thus, once the phone is 
well-worn enough so that the pattern can be ascertained by physical analysis of the phone, 
the pattern is in some sense both like a combination to a lock and a key to a strongbox: It 
is the contents of the phone owner’s mind, but it is also ascertainable from physical at-
tributes of the phone that can be measured without the suspect’s participation. 
 72 See Lucy Cockcroft, Liars are Exposed by Blinking, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 20, 2008, 8:32 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2589073/Liars-are-exposed-by-blinking.html. 
 73 See You Can’t Hide Your Lyin’ Eyes, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH (July 12, 2010), 
http://unews.utah.edu/news_releases/you-can039t-hide-your-lyin039-eyes/. 
 74 See Declan McCullagh, Homeland Security Moves Forward with “Pre-Crime” Detection, CNET 
(Oct. 7, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20117058-281/homeland-
security-moves-forward-with-pre-crime-detection/. 
 75 See id. 
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mind, even when he or she declines to provide a verbal answer.  It is 
easy to envision a sort of “20 questions” approach designed to elicit 
information that might make a password easier to crack.  For exam-
ple, a suspect’s reaction to questions such as “does your password 
have fewer than 10 characters?” or “does it contain any numbers?” 
might allow investigators to greatly narrow the set of possible pass-
words, thereby increasing their ability to access a secured device using 
a brute force search. 
The end game for these sorts of approaches lies in technologies 
that quite literally measure the contents of a person’s mind.  Func-
tional MRI (fMRI), which enables real-time measurement of localized 
activity within the brain, is starting to make this feasible. 
In 2011, Princeton researchers demonstrated that it is “possible to 
generate text about the mental content reflected in brain images.”76  
The researchers “found that they could confidently determine from 
an fMRI image the general topic on a participant’s mind, but that de-
ciphering specific objects was trickier.”77  For example, while today’s 
fMRI methods might make it possible to determine that a person is 
thinking about a vegetable as opposed to a type of furniture, they are 
unable to identify which specific vegetable the person is visualizing.  
fMRI methods of the future will presumably allow more specificity. 
The prospect that fMRI methods could be used to forcibly extract 
information from a person’s mind is chilling.  However, investigators 
clearly have the right to videotape an interrogation, and subsequently 
study the video for cues contained in eye movements and respiration.  
The use of cameras with sufficiently high resolution to discern pupil 
dilation and pulse rate is equally unlikely to be deemed unconstitu-
tional. 
At some point, however, government use of these newer technol-
ogies will run up against the Fifth Amendment.  In the near future, 
fMRI technologies might enable the extraction of simple thoughts 
such as information relating to passwords.  In our opinion, using 
fMRI methods to extract information raises questions both of the tes-
timonial nature of the act and of compulsion. 
Allen and Mace have argued that “testimony is the substantive 
content of cognition.”78  While this definition has not been adopted 
by the Court, the use of fMRI methods presents an eye-opening case 
 
 76 Francisco Pereira, Greg Detre & Matthew Botvinick, Generating Text from Functional Brain 
Images, FRONTIERS IN HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Aug. 2011, at 1. 
 77 Morgan Kelly, Word Association: Princeton Study Matches Brain Scans with Complex Thought, 
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (Aug. 31, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.princeton.edu/main/
news/archive/S31/47/31I07/index.xml?section=topstories. 
 78 Allen & Mace, supra note 38, at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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study on the limits of the current definition of “testimony.”  Technol-
ogies such as fMRI call for outdated definitions of testimony to be 
clarified to fully encapsulate and protect the “contents of [our] 
mind.” 
In our opinion, not only must the definitions of testimony and 
cognition be linked, but suspects must also be able to positively assert 
their Fifth Amendment privilege against such invasive procedures.  
We suggest that the assertion of the privilege can be characterized as 
“positive” or “negative.”  In a “positive” framework, to protect the 
products of his or her cognition (the Curcio “contents of his mind”), a 
suspect has the right to affirmatively assert the privilege to stop the 
government from analyzing his or her brainwaves.  In a “negative” 
framework, a suspect only has the right to refuse to use his or her vo-
lition to furnish the government with the “contents of his mind.”  
Without linking testimony and cognition, he or she has no right to 
affirmatively stop the government from procuring those contents by 
other means; the use of emerging technologies to reverse-engineer 
thoughts would pose no Fifth Amendment problem. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Properly bringing the foregone conclusion doctrine into the digi-
tal era is challenging but necessary; we believe that “location” is nei-
ther constitutionally required nor practically feasible as applied to the 
mechanisms commonly used to store and access documents today, 
and that “possession” is the correct standard to be applied.  “Exist-
ence” remains an appropriate prong of the foregone conclusion doc-
trine, though there are new challenges to establishing it.  As we have 
explained, it is important to ensure that suspects are protected from 
interpretations of “existence” that would open the door to fishing 
expeditions by the government.  Additionally, while updating the def-
inition of what constitutes a testimonial act presents challenges that 
have bedeviled the Court for many years, emerging technologies 
make this an issue in need of clarification. 
In closing, we again emphasize a point made in the introduc-
tion—it is exceedingly difficult to unravel the tightly intertwined na-
ture of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and examine only one in a 
vacuum.  However, we believe the foregone conclusion doctrine and 
the limitations on the definition of testimony present discrete—and 
pressing—opportunities for the Court to clarify Fifth Amendment 
doctrine so that it can be interpreted and applied in a manner more 
consistent with today’s technologies. 
 
 
